Introduction
In John Milton's epic, Adam and Eve are cast out of Eden as punishment for acts of their own volition. In perhaps a crueler fate, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) never had the chance to enjoy its position as the only legally-recognized tax haven for United States (US) tax payers. Instead, the US Congress unilaterally stripped tax and trade provisions from a bilateral treaty between the FSM and the US known as the Compact of Free Association. In return for the removal of these provisions, $60 million was made available to the FSM under a program known as the Investment Development Fund (IDF). Only $20 million of this Fund was ever released, and the FSM has never realized the economic potential originally envisioned by the Compact signatories. Now, ten years after the end of the original Compact of Free Association, and twenty-five years after it was first enacted, this paper makes a renewed attempt to quantify what the FSM lost when the tax and trade provisions were rescinded. Documenting this loss is an important first step for the FSM to make a claim for the remaining $40 million of the IDF. in the country. Beyond these core economic and security matters, the Compact also established that FSM citizens could live and work in the US without a visa, ensured FSM citizens' eligibility for US Federal Programs, and enabled FSM citizens to serve in the US military. However, despite these strong linkages, the FSM retains international recognition as a fully sovereign state, having acceded to the United Nations in 1991.
In addition to the unique political arrangement established under the Compact, the treaty also contained a number of tax and trade provisions that would have created novel economic relations between the two countries. While these provisions were agreed to by the US Executive, and were included in the final treaty initialed on 1 October 1982 by representatives of the FSM and US, they were effectively altered or invalidated by sections 401 and 403 of the US implementing legislation, Public Law 99-239. The replacement for the removal of these tax and trade provisions was the $60 million IDF.
In the absence of the Compact tax and trade provisions, and with a poorly performing IDF, the FSM economy has largely stagnated. After seven years of modest growth during the late 1980's, while the FSM economy adjusted to the increased economic assistance under the Compact, economic performance has virtually flat lined. In fact, real GDP in FY2009 is only two percent higher than in FY1993 -an average annualized growth rate of 0.14%. The private sector, in particular, is anemic -accounting for no more than 26% of GDP since the statistic began to be recorded in FY1995.The extent of these economic doldrums has prompted observers such as Hezel (2006) to ask "Is that the best you can do?" and to engender claims from him and others, such as Friberg et al (2006) , suggesting that the FSM resign itself to life as a MIRABmigration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy -economy as coined by Bertram (1985 Bertram ( , 2006 ). An economic overview by Author (2010) suggests that the FSM suffers from a form of "Dutch Disease" brought on by the massive aid flows of the Compact, which have kept tradable production near nil and fueled household-based consumption in the FSM. All of these authors note the paucity of investment in the FSM and the likelihood for continued economic malaise in the absence of significant reform. 
The Tax Haven that Never Was
As noted by a United States Government Accountability Office (GAO 2008, p. 2) report, Dharmapala (2008) , and others, there is no standardized definition of a "tax haven." 2 The term has, however, traditionally carried a negative connotation and is often seen as a tool for facilitating questionable practices of tax evasion or avoidance (Hines 1997 , Devereux 2007 . As noted by Dharmapala (2008) , the OECD (2004), in particular, has painted tax havens as harmful and distorting to the global economy -sentiments that are echoed by the IMF (2006) or Braithwaite (2005) . This negative view driven by a perception that tax havens divert economic activity from non-havens, although the theoretical and empirical bases of this claim have recently been challenged (Desai et al. 2006) . A review of the literature identifies a number of characteristics that are common to tax havens. Hines and Rice (1994, p.175) suggested four attributes including low tax rates, legislated banking secrecy, sophisticated communication infrastructure, and "self-promotion as an offshore financial center." A recurring theme in the discussion of tax havens is that they are often located in small-island states. Hines and Rice (1994, p.153) (Davidson 1987 , GAO 1996 . Thus, in addition to possessing the physical, institutional, and demographic characteristics of tax havens presented in Table 1 , the FSM would have been a jurisdiction with preferential tariff access to the US, a US-modeled legal system, and had favorable corporate tax incentives in a tax regime that was a vestige of US Trust Territory administration. The combination of these factors would have almost certainly have made the FSM as attractive a "tax haven" to US citizens and corporations as any other jurisdiction in the world. Accordingly, although still a counter-factual exercise, it is entirely reasonable to extrapolate the plausible economic performance in the FSM had these provisions been in place, based on empirical evaluation of other tax havens during a similar time period.
What the FSM Lost
Accepting provisions. While neither of the examples given below is perfectly analogous to the FSM situation, they can be viewed as instructive of how a Pacific-island economy can respond to favorable tax and/or trade regulations.
American Samoa
American Samoa has been a formal US possession since 1899 and remains an unorganized, unincorporated territory. American Samoa is smaller than the FSM, at less than one-third the landmass and slightly more than one-half the population. Beyond land area, the FSM has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that is substantially larger than American Samoa's, as the FSM's EEZ extends from over 600 points of land, while American Samoa is comprised of just a handful of islands. American Samoa has both a governor and a bi-cameral legislature that largely oversee affairs of the territory (CIA 2011).
The economy of American Samoa performed markedly better than the FSM's from 1986-2001.
This divergence in performance is largely due to the significant presence of the US tuna industry in American Samoa. In addition to long-line and purse seine fishing in the waters of American Samoa, the country was also host to large scale tuna processing operations -specifically tuna "I are talking about a cannery, and I think, well, it is such a massive thing, who is going to move that cannery around the Pacific? … I will tell you, it isn't hard to put up a cannery. Van Camp is putting up a cannery in American Samoa now … put up in around 3 or 4 months. That is no problem to move these canneries around, and that is why I can assure you that I are concerned; I are almost certain that there will be shifts, and they will come soon, too, because it is not hard to pack up a cannery and move it around the 10 Excerpts from US Congressional (US Congress 1984 , pp. 74-45, US Congress 1985 testimony.Mr. Lagomarsino (Robert J. Lagomarsino, California Representative): "… there is at least a potential for Micronesia fishermen in the area?" Mr. Gordon (William Gordon, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, US Department of Commerce): "The potential is there. The problem is the tremendous capital investment … It might well come through foreign investment..." Mr. Lagomarsino: "Under section 242 of the compact … duty-free imports can be brought into the United States … How do you view that as a potential threat to the U.S. tuna industry?" Mr. Gordon: "I think it is of major concern to the tuna industry. I was in American Samoa early last week and found U.S. canners there extremely concerned that foreign investments will be used to ship tuna duty-free into the United States…." Mr. Lagomarsino: "Mr. Berg, would you care to comment on this aspect?" Mr. Berg (James Berg, Political and Economic Adviser, Micronesian Status Negotiations, US Department of State): "… Finally, with respect to the tuna industry, I know that there is concern in the industry, but there is also interest … in investing in the area ( 
The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands
The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI) is the second illustrative case, and shares even more in common with the FSM than American Samoa. The CNMI and FSM both belong to the geographic and ethno-cultural region known as Mirconesia and the CNMI had entertained joining with the FSM in a much larger Federation that was discussed during the dissolution of the Trust Territory. At 464 sq km, the CNMI is about two-thirds the size of the FSM with a population that is less than half of the FSM's 102,000 citizens. Like American Samoa, the CNMI also has a governor and bi-cameral legislature that govern island life (CIA 2011).
Unlike American Samoa, textiles and tourism were the main vehicles of economic growth in the CNMI during the Compact period. Again, using its preferential arrangements under Section 936
and Headnote 3a, the CNMI was able to establish a significant garment manufacturing industry.
Although annualized data is unavailable, CNMI (2002) Thus, compared to its US insular sisters, the FSM's weak economic performance seems attributable, at least in part, to its lack of preferential tax structure and tariff access. 
Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggests that the FSM economy suffered substantially when the tax and Given what was lost to the FSM during the Compact period, it is unlikely that it can ever fully recover to the growth path that might have been. However, the scope of this loss provides a strong impetus for releasing the remaining $40 million of the IDF to spur productive development in the FSM. Dharmapala (2008) Lack of transparency in the operation of legislative, legal, or administrative provisions Hines and Rice (1994) , GAO(2008) No requirement of a substantive local presence GAO(2008) Self-promotion as an offshore financial center Hines and Rice (1994) 
